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Introduction 

ince  7973,  the European  Commission has been measuring public opinion 
to  inform itself about the views of European  Union  citizens and to share the 
obtained information  with  the general public through  a plethora of sources, 
including more recently the electronic media. 
Over  the  past 25 years,  the  Commission's  public  opinion  surveys  have col­
lected  information  about  nearly  every  aspect  of  European  Union  life. 
Although much of the work has  focused on public support for and knowledge 
of the  European  Union,  its  policies  and  its  institutions,  the  Eurobarometer 
surveys  have also  looked at how satisfied Europeans  are  with  the  life  they 
lead,  what their expectations of the  future  are and what their concerns are, 
to nome but a few  examples.  The surveys have covered public opinion about 
issues as  varied as modern  biotechnology, the information society.  the envi­
ronment, poverty and the single market.  Furthermore,  the surveys have often 
focused on  the opinion of young people,  women  or top managers. 
The  purpose of this  brochure  is  to  present readers  with  a selection  of find­
ings  from  these Commission  surveys.  As  the title of the brochure implies,  it 
provides readers  with  a picture of how Europeans see themselves by looking 
at a variety of subjects: citizens' values and life satisfaction at the end of the 
20th  century.  European  citizenship,  public  opinion  towards  the  European 
Union,  public support for  the policies of the European  Union,  public opinion 
towards a number of issues that EU citizens worry about ...  Particular cate­
gories  - the young,  women  and top decision-makers  - are  the  focus  of the 
sixth chapter.  The  final  chapter of the brochure looks  towards  the  future  by 
looking  at people's expectations of the 27 st century.  people's perceived and 
desired  role  of the European  Union  in  the  27st century and by reporting  on 
the views of young Europeans  who  are,  after all,  Europe's  future  leaders. How  Euro pcJ ns  sec  I  il "'Il1 ~ ('l v(,5 
Europeans 
at the end  of the 20th century 
ow thot we  are  entering  the  21st century,  it seems  appropriate  to  firstly  look  at how 
satisfied the citizens of the European  Union  have been  with  their lives during  the last quar­
ter of the  previous  century.  The  Eurobarometer  survey,  which  has  been  carried out twice  a 
year  in  all  Member  States  since  1973,  provides  this  information.  In  this  chap ter,  we  also 
address the legacy of the 20th century.  Last but not least,  we look at the values of European 
citizens at the end of the second millennium. 
4 Tech nica I sped  ficati 0 ns 
Eurobarometer surveys 
Fieldwork: each spring and autumn since  1973. 
Coverage:  EU  citizens aged  15 and over residing in any of the European Union Member States. 
Sample size:  1 000 respondents  p  r country except Luxembourg  (500),  the  United  Kingdom 
(1  000 in Great Britain and 300 in North  rn  Ireland) and  Germany (1  000 in  East Germany and 
1 000 in West Germany). 
Margin of error: ± 3.1  010. 
Institute responsible  for fieldwork:  INRA (ECO). 
Next to the Eurobarometer,  the Commission also  'arries out ad  hoc public opinion polls (usu­
ally over  the  telephone)  under the name of  the  Flash Eurobarometer.  Furthermore, a central 
and  east  European  Euroborometer  has  been  carried  out sinc  1990  and  has  recently  been 
r  placed  by  the applicant countries'  Euroborometer which  measures  public opinion  towards 
the European Union in  the countries that ha ve applied to become part of the European Union. 
A continuous tracking survey (CTS)  was  field  d from January 1996 to December 1998.  It suc­
CI"  ded  the small  pilot  telephone  'Monthly monitoring'  created  in  1994.  These  results  were 
regularly published  in  Europinion reports until the end of 1997.  The  Commission  also  carries 
out qualitative studies to study certain  topics more in-depth or to prepare  a general  popula­
tion survey. 
Flash  Eurobarometer surveys 
Fieldwork:  ad  hoc  if  and  wh  n  need  d  by  a  service  of  the  Commission  or  other 

institutions/agencies of the EO. 

Coverage: EU citizens aged  15 and over r  siding in any of the European Union Member States. 

Special  target groups can  also  be  investigat  d. 

Sample size: Most of the time  1 000 respondent  per country, with the exception of Germany 

where the sample has been set at 2 000 respondents. 

Margin of error: ± 3.1  %. 

Institut(' responsible  for fieldwork: EOS  Gallup Europe. 

Continuous tracking surveys 

Fieldwork: 6 days a week,  44 we  ks a year  from January 1996 until December  1998. 

Coverage: EU  citizens aged  15 and over r  siding in any of tl1  European  Union Member States. 

Sample size:  800 respondents per country, with the exception  of Germany where  the sample 

has been  set at 1 600 respond  nts. 

Margin of error: ± 3.5 0/0. 

Institute responsible for fieldwork: Euroquest MRB. 

5 life satisfaction 
Over the years the survey  has regularly asked 
European  Union  citizens  how  satisfied  they 
are  with  their  life in  general .  This  life satis­
faction  question  is  a summary  measure  of 
how  people  feel  about  all  things  related  to 
their lives,  ranging  from  their personal  hap­
piness,  their  health,  their  family  and  their 
economic  situation  to  their  views  about 
society  in  general. 
During  the  last  quarter of the  20th  century, 
at  least  75  010  of EU  citizens  have  indicated 
that  they  are  happy  with  the  life  they  lead 
Graph  1:  Life satisfaction  1973-99 EU  average 
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with  the  latest  measurement  showing  that 
more  than  8 in  10 people  feel  positive about 
their life. As Graph  1 shows,  satisfaction lev­
els  are  higher  in  periods  of economic  well­
being  and  lower during more  difficult times, 
such  as  in  1975  when  people  were  feeling 
the  economic effects of the  oil crisis. 
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EU- 1Z+  CU- I :, Th  legacy of the 20th century  Nearly  three  in  four  EU  citizen s  rate  the 
legacy left in  the  area  of freedom  as  (fairly) 
In  the  autum n of 1998,  the  Euroborometer  positive  (72  %)  ('),  More  than  ha If of the 
asked  its respondents to  rate  the  legacy  of  public also  feel positive about what young er 
the  20th  century for the  following  11  areas:  generations  will  find  in  terms  of quality of 
freedom,  quality of life, equality,  solidarity,  life  (58  %) and  equality (54  a/a),  People  are 
soc ial  security  and  welfare,  purchasing  most  pessimistic  when  it comes to  employ­
power,  working  conditions,  personal  safety,  ment (68  % ) and  the environment (66 %), 
morality  and  ethics,  the  environment  and 
employmen t (Gra ph  2)  ('), 
Graph  2: The  legacy of the 20th century (EU-15)
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The  values of Europeans 	 believe  it is  important to  be  involved  in  cre­
ating  a better society,  These  societal  values 
We often read  or hear about how individual­ are  strong  in  each  of the  15 Member States, 
istic  our  society  has  become,  Yet  survey 
results  indicate  that Europeans  are  sti ll  very  So  while  these  results  may  calm  concerns 
interested in their fellow citizens,  More th an  about  the  extent  to  which  individualism  is 
9 in  10  EU  citizens  feel  th at  it is  extremely  affecting life at the end  of the  20th century, 
or  very  important  to  help  others  and  to  EU  citizens  nonetheless  seem  to  have  a 
value  people  for  who  they  are  (Graph  3),  yearning for traditionalism (Graph  4),  Nearly 
Furthermore,  more  than  8 in  10  Europeans  7 in  10 want to  live in a world  in  which  peo­
('I 	 Respondents were asked  the  following  question: 'In less  than  two years,  we will be  in  the  21st  centllry,  How would you 
ratt the legacy left to young people by older generations  in  the following areas)' 
(') 	 Respondents could rate the  legacy as 'fairly negative' or 'fairly positive',  As  usual,  th ey could also  reply 'don't know', Graph 3: The  values of Europeans  %  saying  it is extremely or very important 
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Graph  4: The  values of Europeans % strongly or  tending  to  agree 
'I  want a world wilere people:  IIv~ 
by  tradi  ional va lu  ' 
'W~ ' d be better off if  we retumed to 
our trad i\iun,ll way of doing thing' 
'A  husband's job is  to earn  the money an(1 
a wife's job  s to look after the home' 
pie  live  by  traditional values  and  just about 
half of the  people  feel  that  we'd  be  better 
off if we  returned  to our traditional  ways of 
doing  things.  However,  a longing  for  tradi­
tionalism  does  not  necessarily  mean  that 
everything should go back  to the way it used 
to  be: only  25  %  of Europeans  agree  that a 
husband's  job  is  to  earn  the  money  and  a 
wife's  job  is  to  look  after  the  home. 
Traditional  values  are  most  prominent  in 
Greece  and  least  popular in  the  Netherlands, 
Denmark and  Sweden. 
A  clear  sign  of  modern  times  is  the  value 
people  attach  to  success  and  self-develop­
ment.  Three  in  four EU  citizens regard  being 
successful in life as important and half of the 
people  feel  this  way  about  making  a lot of 
money.  Furthermore,  we  find  that 79  Ofo  of 
68 
51 
25 
EU  citizens  feel  it is  important to  put more 
time and  effort into their own  self-develop­
ment  and  68  %  feel  it is  important  to  dis­
cover  more  things about themselves. European citizenship 

ne  of the  main  objectives  of the  European  Union  is  to  introduce  European  citizenship. 
The  concept was  first introduced by the Maastricht  Treaty  which states: 'Every person  hold­
ing  the nationality of a Member State sholl be  a citizen of the Union'.  The  1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty  clarifies  the  link  between  European  and national citizenship.  It  states unequivocally 
that  'citizenship  of the  Union  shall  complement  and  not  replace  national  citizenship: 
Furthermore,  the Amsterdam Treaty gives every citizen of the Union  the right to  write  to any 
of the EU institutions in one of the  11  languages of the  Treaties and receive an answer in  the 
some language. Do  citizens feel  attached to  Europe? 
In  order for people  to  feel  like  European  cit­
izens,  they  should  first  and  foremost  feel 
some  basic  sense  of geographic  attachment 
to  Europ e.  The  spring  1999  Eurobarometer 
survey found  that nearly 6 in  10  EU  citizens 
feel very or  fairly attach ed to Europe.  People 
in  Lu xembourg  (78 0/0)  are most likely to  feel 
very or  fairly attached, followed by people in 
Sweden  and  Denmark (both  71  0/0)  (Graph  5). 
People  in  the  UK  are  least  likely  to  feel 
atta ched  (37  0/0).  followed  by  people  in 
Greece (41  %) and  the  Netherlands  (49  a/oj. 
More  than  half of the  respondents living  in 
the  nine  remaining  Member States  feel  very 
or  fairly attached to  Europe. 
Graph  5: Feeling  attached to  Europe 
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among citi zens? 
Apart  from  a sense  of geographical  attach­
ment,  in  the context of European  citizenship 
it is  al so important that people  feel  psycho­
logically  attached  to  Europe.  Although  at 
the end of the 20th century one can  still not 
speak  of the  existence of a truly  European 
identity,  the  majority of EU  citizens feel  to 
some  extent  European.  However,  this  is  an 
issue  where opinions differ greatly between 
countries (Graph  6). 
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10 Graph  6:  European and  national identity 
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People  in  Luxembourg  are  most likely to  feel 
European  only  (20  0/0) .  This is  much  higher 
than  in  any  of  the other countries and  can 
be  explained  by  the  high  proportion of citi­
zens  from  other  EU  countries  that  reside  in 
Luxembourg.  Nonetheless,  there  are  seven 
other  countries  where  people  who  feel  to 
some  extent  European  are  in  the  majority. 
These  are,  in  rank  order,  Italy  (71  0 /0),  Spain 
(63  0/0),  France  (59  0 /0 ).  Belgium  (57  a /oJ.  the 
Netherlands  (55  0/0),  Austri a  (50  0/0)  and 
Germany  (49  0/0).  In  the other EU  countries, 
people  who  identify  only  with  their  own 
nationality are  in  the  majority,  although  in 
Portugal  (52  0 /0)  and  Ireland  (53  0/0)  this 
0/0 European and nationality 
Ufo  nationality only 
majority  is  very  small.  In  the  UK  (67  a/o J. 
Sweden,  Finland  (both  61  a/oJ.  Greece  (60  0/0) 
and,  to  a  slightly  lesser  extent,  Denmark 
(56  0/0)  national identity is very strong. 
11 Is  there a shared European 
cultural identity? 
The  idea  of citizenship  also  implies a shared 
cultural  identity.  38  %  of EU  citizens agree 
that  there  is  a  sh ared  European  cultural 
identity  and  49  %  disagree  (')  (Graph  7) 
However, there are  large differences of opin­
ion  about  this  issue  among  the  15  Member 
Sta tes. 
People  in  Greece  [49 0/0)  and  Portugal  (47  0/0) 
are  most  likely  to  be li eve  in  a  sh ared 
European  cultura l identity, followed  by  peo­
ple  in  Germa ny  (43  0/0)  and  Italy  [42  0/0). 
People  in  Finl and  (65  a/oJ.  France  and 
Denmark (both  59 0/0) are  most  likely to  dis­
agree.  Although  we  find  lower  levels  of 
agreement  among  nations  where  there  are 
more  Eurosceptic  people,  feeling  European 
and  believing  in  the  existence  of  a shared 
European cultural identity do not go  hand  in 
hand . 
Graph  7: There  is  a European cultural identity shared by all Europeans 
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Graph 8: Satisfaction with the way democracy works in  the European  Union 
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Satisfaction  with  the  way  democ­
racy  works  in  the European  Un ion 
Last  but  not  least,  people's  acceptance  of 
their  European  citizenship  is  dependent  on 
satisfactory  acceptance  levels  with  the  way 
democracy works in  the European  Union.  On 
average,  4 in  10  EU  citizens are satisfied with 
the  way  democracy  works  [Graph  8). 
EL  NL  D  FIN  DK  UK  S 
Ofo  not very and  not at all 
However, this average hides large differences 
in  opinion  among  the  citizens  from  the  15 
Member States.  In  Spain  and  Ireland around 
6 in  10 people are satisfied while in  Denmark 
and  Sweden  around  6 in  10  people  are  not 
satisfied. 
13 Graph 9: Satisfaction with EU  democracy 
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The  resignation  of the European Commission  Knowledge of citizens'  rights 
in  March  1999 made a significant impact on 
how  people  feel  about  the  way  democracy  For  Europeans  to  start  thinking  of  them­
works  in  the European  Union.  Following  the  selves  as  European  citizens,  it is also  impera­
Commission's  resignation,  satisfaction  levels  tive  th at they are  aware of the  rights which 
increased  significantly.  The  spring  1999  European  citizenship  confers  on  them.  In 
Euroborometer results indicate  that 42  %  of  order to measure people's knowledge of their 
EU  citizens  were  satisfied  with  the  way  European  citizens,  respondents  to rights  as 
democracy  works  in  the  European  Union,  th e autumn  1996  survey had  a list of rights 
compared  to  only  35  Ofo  in  the  autumn  of  and  obligations read  out to them  and  were 
1998.  asked  whether  each  of  these  was  true  or 
false  (G raph  10). 
People  who  regard  their country's member­
ship  of the  EU  as  a good  thing  (supporters) 
are  significantly  more  likely  to  be  satisfied 
than  people  who  regard  their  country's 
membership  as  a  bad  thing  (opp on ents) 
(Graph  9) 
14 Graph  10: Knowledge of citizens' rights 
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The  large  majority  of  citizens  were  aware 
that they have  the  right to study and  seek 
work placements in  other EU  Member States. 
Many people  also  knew  that it is  not neces­
sary to change driving licences when moving 
to  another  EU  country  and  that  one  is 
allowed  to  have  a  savings  account  with  a 
bank or buy insurance in another EU  country. 
% false 
People were uncertain about the other state­
ments with equal numbers believing them to 
be  true  and  false.  To  find  out  about  your 
rights, contact Europe  Direct: 
h ttp://europa.eu.int/europedirect 
\5 The  European  Union 

number of regularly asked questions  from  the  Eurobarometer  survey look  at people's 
knowledge about and support for the European  Union. 
Knowledge  and  awareness  low  (').  Only  26  %  of EU  citizens  feel  they 
know  quite a lot  to  a great  deal  (i.e. those 
As  Table  1 shows,  most  people  feel  they  do  choosing  the  numbers  6 through  10  on  the 
not know  much  about  the  European  Union,  scale). 
as  self-perceived knowledge  levels are  quite 
I')  Responcit'nls to the aulUmn  1999 [urobarometer survey  were asked  how Illuch 1 1 tey  know "buut Ihe European  U, lOOIi. Its 
policies and  Its institutio ns  hy selecting  from:l card  J  number - on  Cl  scale  from 1 to 10  - wh ich  bl...: :::i  n:preSr rllS  their per­
ceived  knowledge  about tl,c European  Union.  The  higher the number they select.  the more they fed  they know about th e 
EU. 
16 These  are  average  results  for  the  population  Table  1: Self-perceived knowledge of 
of the  15 European Union Member States.  In 
order to depict the large amount of variation 
that exists  between  the  15 countries,  Graph 
11  shows each  cou ntry's average score  (').  As 
can  be  seen,  knowledge  levels  range  from  a 
low  of 3.4  in  the  UK  to  a high  of  5.25  in 
Austria. 
The  survey also  measures  people's awareness 
of nine  of the  European  Union's  institutions 
(Graph  12).  The  institutions included  in  the 
survey  are  the  European  Parliament,  the 
European  Commission,  the  Council  of 
Ministers,  the  Court of Justice,  the  European 
Ombudsman, the European Central  Bank,  the 
European  Court of Auditors,  the  Committee 
of the  Regions  and  the  Social  and  Economic 
Committee. 
EU  affairs. Autumn  1999 (in  0/0,  EU-15) 
1 (know nothing at all)  10 
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Graph  11:  Levels of perceived  knowledge about the  EU 
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(.) 	 The average scores.  or means. show the cen tral  tendency of the responses and  represent the sum  of the responses for each 
of the 10  points on the scale times the value of each point divicted by the  total number of responses. 
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Graph  12: Have you  ever  heard  of ... ? (EU-15) 
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People  are  most  likely  to  have  heard  of the  people  feel  they  know  about  the  EU,  the 
European  Parliament (91  0/0),  followed by  the  more  likely  it is  that they  have  heard  of the 
European  Commission  (78  0/0)  and  the  EU  institutions (Table  2) 
European  Central  Bank  (69  0/0).  People  are 
least  likely  to  have  heard  of  the  three 
youngest EU  institutions ­ the Committee of 
the  Regions  (26  0/0)  and  the  Social  and 
Economic  Committee  (34  0/0)  - and  the 
European  Ombudsman  (31  0/0 ).  The  more 
Table  2: Awareness  levels of the  EU  institutions by self-perceived knowledge about the 
European  Union (in 0/0) 
Institution 
European Parliament 
European Commission 
European Central Bank 
Council of Ministt'rs 
Court of Justice 
Court of Auditors 
Social and Economic Committee 
Committee of the Regions 
European  Ombudsman 
High 
knowledge 
level 
97 
93 
91 
86 
84 
76 
67 
56 
48 
Average  Low 
knowledge  knowledge 
level  level 
96  83 
87  64 
79  53 
71  41 
72  45 
55  28 
42  19 
32  14 
36  21 
18 Support for European  Union 
membership 
The  Eurobarometers  most  popular  Indicator 
of  EU  support  was  introduced  in  1973.  It 
measures  whether  people  think  their coun­
try's membership  to  the  European  Union  is  a 
good  thing, a bad  thing or  neither good  nor 
bad  (Graph  13). 
During  the  years  that  the  Community  con­
sisted  of nine countries, that is from  1973 to 
1980, support fluctuated between  a high  of 
63  Ofo,  measured  in  the  autumn of 1975, and 
a  low  of 53  0/0,  measured  in  the  spring  of 
1976,  the  spring of 1978 and  the autumn of 
1980.  Although support for EEC membership 
was  obtained  from  more  than  half of the 
public during  these  early years,  public  opin­
ion  was  still  somewhat  unstable  as  support 
levels  jumped  up  and  down  from  one 
measurement to the next without the occur­
rence  of any significant events. 
The  next  decade,  during  which  the 
Community  expanded  to  include  Greece 
Spain  and  Portugal  ('),  is marked  by a far  les~ 
volatile  public  opinion,  with  support  for 
membership increasing  from  50 %  in  1981  to 
65 %  in  1987.  In  the spring  of 1988, support 
dropped  significantly to  58  0/0.  This  drop  ­
possibly  representing  public  anxiety  con­
cerning  the  reform of both  the Community's 
financial  system  and  the  common  agricul­
tural  policy,  which  was  agreed  in  February 
1988 - turned  out to  be  only temporary.  In 
the  autumn  of 1988,  support  levels  rose  to 
66  %  and  until the  end of the  1980s around 
two  in  three  citizens  supported  their coun­
try's mem bersh ip. 
In  the spring of 1991, support levels reached 
an  all-time  high  of 72  Ofo.  The  economic 
well-being  of  Europeans  was  high  and 
unemployment  levels  were  low  during  this 
period.  Furthermore,  people  were  looking 
forward  to  the  advantages  they would  soon 
receive  from  the  forthcoming  European 
'single  market'.  In  Germany,  the  significant 
surge  in  support  levels  can  in  part  be 
explained  by  the  euphoria  that existed  fol­
lowing  the  country's reunification.  Support 
was  particularly widespread  among  the  citi ­
zens  of the  former  Democratic  Republic  of 
Germany  who  have  been  included  in  the 
Eurobarometer  sample  from  1990  onwards. 
Unfortunately, the sense  of optimism caused 
by  the  reunification  was short-lived and  this 
affected  people's  perceptions  of  the 
European Community.  In  East Germany, sup­
port levels dropped  from 87 Ofo  in  the autumn 
of 1990  to  55  Ofo  in  the  autumn of 1992;  in 
West  Germany,  they  fell  from  69  %  to  57  0/0 
during this period. 
('J  Greece jOined  in  1981; Spain  and  Portugal jOined  in  1986. 
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Graph  13: Support for European  Union membership  1981-99 EU  average 
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The  1990s clea rly represent  the  period  when 
public  support  for the  European  Union  was 
at its weakest.  The  Gulf War,  the  economic 
crisis and  the  high unemployment levels that 
followed,  the  debate  on  the  Maastricht 
Treaty,  the war in Yugoslavia,  the inclusion of 
three  relatively  eurosceptic  nations and  the 
SSE  crisis are  but some of the reasons which 
help  explain  why  support  dropped  from 
72  %  in  1991  to  46  %  in  the spri ng  of 1997. 
The  late  1990s have  seen  popularity  levels 
slowly  but  consistently  increase.  In  the 
spring  of 1998,  support  levels  rose  to  above 
50  %  for  the  first  time since  1995  and  the 
positive trend  that started  in  the  autumn  of 
1997 continued with 54  %  of citizens saying 
that  their  country's  membership  to  the 
European  Union  is  a good  thing.  Following 
the resignation of the  European  Commission 
in  March  1999,  support  for  EU  membership 
fell  to  49  %  but this drop  turned  out to  be 
temporary  as  support levels were  back  up  to 
51  0/0  by  autumn  1999  (Graph  14). 
20 Graph  14: Support for  European  Union  membership 
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Another  long-standing  question  measures 
whether people  feel  their country has  ben­
efited  from  membership.  Back  in  1983, 
when  the  question was  first asked,  52  % of 
the  people  living  in  the  10  Member  States 
of the  EEC  believed  their country had  ben­
efited,  compared  to  25  010  who  felt  their 
country had  not benefited.  Nowadays,  the 
public  is  more  divided  on  this  issue:  on 
average,  46  010  of the  ci tizens  from  the  15 
13  38 
32 
35 
20 
24 
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Member States feel  their country has bene­
fited  while  31  %  hold  the  view  that  their 
country  has  not  benefited.  At  23  %,  the 
proportion  of  people  who  feel  unable  to 
make  a judgment is  the  same  in  1999  as  it 
was  in  1983  (Graph  15) 
21 Graph  15: Benefit for  European  Union  membership  1983-99 EU  average 
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People  in  Ireland  are  by  far most likely to be  the  UK,  less  than  3  in  10  people  feel  that 
of  the  opinion  that their country has  bene­ their country  has  benefited  from  EU  mem­
fited  (88  %l.  followed  at a distance by peo­ bership. 
ple  in  Portug al  (77  0/0)  (Graph  16).  At  least 
half of  the  people  in  Luxembourg,  Greece, 
the  Netherlands, Denmark,  Spain,  Italy and 
Belgium  share  this  opinion.  In  Sweden  and 
22 Graph  16: Benefit from  European  Union  membership 
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The  process and  speed  of European 
integration 
The  autumn  1998  Eurobarameter  included 
the  following question: 
'The process of  European in tegration started 
50  years  ago.  During  this time,  would  you 
soy  that a great deal,  a  fair amount,  very 
little or nothing at all has  been  achieved in 
terms of integration?' 
On  average,  11  %  of  Europeans  believe  a 
great deal  has been  achieved during the  past 
50  years  and  a  further  43  %  feel  a  fair 
amount  has  been  achieved.  Around  a third 
of the  European  public  feels  that very  little 
(29  0/0)  or  nothing  at  all  (5  %)  has  been 
achieved. 
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At 75 0/0,  people  in  Luxembourg and Denmark 
are  most  likely  to  feel  that a great deal  or a 
fair amount  has  been  achieved  in  terms  of 
European  integration, followed  by  people  in 
Spain  (70 0/0). Ireland and  Greece (both 66%). 
The  only two countries where  less  than  half 
of the people  hold  the view that a great deal 
or a fair amount has been  achieved  are  Italy 
(41  %l  and  the  UK  (42  OfoJ .  It is  rather sur­
prising  to  find  the  generally  pro-European 
Italians at the bottom of the  list. something 
which  can  probably  be  interpreted  as  their 
way  of saying  that  not  enough  has  been 
achieved  during  these  past  50  years  (Graph 
17J. 
23 100 
Graph  17:  European integration: how much has  been  achieved during the past 50 years? 
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There  is  clear  disagreement  between  sup­
porters  and  opponents  of  the  European 
Union  on  this  issue  (Table  3), 
Table  3:  Relationship between support for the European Union and attitudes 
to how much has been  achieved during the past 50 years 
Membership to the European Union  is: 
Achievement during the past 50 years 
a good t hing  neither good or bad  a bad  thing 
010  010  0/0 
70 
0 ........ 
F  FIN  D  EU-15  S  B  A  UK 
0J0  very little and  nothing at all 
Great deal/fa ir amount  68  44  34 
Very little/no thing at all  25  43  56 
Don't kn ow  7  12  10 
Total  100  99  100 
24 Graph  18: The  'Euro-dynamometer' (EU-12/EU-15 average on seven  point scale - trend) 
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Since  1986,  the  Euroborometer  has  mea­
sured  public  opinion  with  regard  to  the 
speed  of European  integration. 
As  Graph  18  shows,  the  speed  at  which 
Europe  is  perceived  to  be  built has  increased 
since  1996  from  an  average  score  of 3.4  (on 
a scale  of 1 to  7)  to  an  average  score  of 4.0 
(Graph  18).  The  desired  speed,  on  the  other 
hand,  has  remained  more  or  less  unchanged 
during  the  last  few  years.  The  gap  between 
the  perceived  and  desired  speed  has  become 
considerably smaller  since  the  question  was 
first  asked  in  1986  (the  latest  measurement 
shows a net score difference of 0.8 compared 
to a difference of 2.1  in  1986). 
desired 
~ I)  'S ca lr ~ v ;) l lI e d j ff(' Il:nr("'d c ~ lI t"(r m in ll ~ 'current' 
The  gap  between  the  speed  at which  Europe 
is perceived  to be  progressing  and  the  speed 
at  which  people  desire it to  prog ress  varies 
significantly  from  country  to  country.  In 
most  countries  people  would  like  to  see 
Europe built at a faster speed  than  what they 
perceive  it to be with the largest positive  net 
score  found  in  Italy,  Greece,  Portugal  and 
Belgium.  In  Denmark  and  Finland,  there  is a 
small  negative  net  sco re  between  the  per­
ceived  and  desired  speed  (Graph  19). 
25 Graph  19: The  'Euro-dynarnorneter' 
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In  the  spring  1999  survey, respondents  were  one  to  say  if they,  personally,  were  afraid of 
shown  a list  of  11  things  which  people  say  it or not (Graph  20). 
they  are  afraid  of and  were  asked  for each 
26 Graph 20: Fears among European Union citizens (EU-15) 
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The  idea  of jobs  transferring  to  countries  Trust in  the European  Union  and  its 
which  have  lower  production  costs  is  most  institutions 
likely to scare  people  in  the  context of clos­
er unification (61 %l. followed by an  increase  On average, 39 % of Europeans say they tend 
in  drug  trafficking and  international organ­ to  trust  the  European  Union,  40  Ofo  say  they 
ised  crime  (57 0/0).  More  than  half  of  the  tend  not to  trust it and  21  %  lack  an  opin­
public is  also afraid  that the  farmers in their  ion  (I).  However,  there  are  large  variations 
country  will  have  more  difficulties  (56 %l.  between  the  Member  States  (Graph  21). 
that they will  lose social  benefits (53 0/0)  and  More  than  half  of  the  public  in  Portugal 
that  they  will  lose  their  national  currency  (57  0/01.  Spain  (55 0/01.  Italy  (53  0/0)  and 
(51  0/0)  Luxembourg  (52  0/0)  trusts  the  European 
Union  compared  to  less  than  a third  of the 
public  in  the  UK  (20 %l.  Sweden  (21  0/0), 
Germany  (31  0/0),  Denmark and  Austria  (both 
32  0/0)  (' ). 
39 
36 
I')  Eurobarometer 51.0 - Fi eldwork: March-April  1999. 
I')  The  proportion of people who tend not to  trust the Europea n Union is high  es t in Sweden  (61  010)  and  Denm Mk (58 %j.  Th e 
proportion of don't kn ow responses is highest  in  the UK  an d Ireland (both 32  %). 
27 Graph  21: Trust in the European Union 
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Whether people trust  the European Union or  likely to say  they tend  to  trust the European 
not also  depends on  how they generally feel  Union than those who regard  their country's 
about their country's membership of the EU.  membership as  a bad  thing (Table  4). 
Those  who  regard  their  country's  member­
ship  as  a  good  thing  are  signi fi ca ntly more 
Table 4: Trust in the European Union by support levels (in 0/0) 
EU  membership  EU  membership  EU  membership 

is a good  is  neither  is a bad 

thing  good nor bad  thing 

Tend  to trust  57  26  11 
Tend  not to  trust  27  50  74 
Don't know  16  24  15 
Total  100  100  100 
28 27 
Graph  22  Trust in  EU  institutions (EU-15) 
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Graph  22  shows  the  extent  to  which 
Europeans tend to trust and  tend  not to trust 
nine of the  Union's institutions. 
At  53  0/0,  the  European  Parliament  receives 
the most  widespread  trust, with the Court of 
Justice and  the European Commission  in  sec­
ond  and  third  place,  respectively  (both 
45  0/0).  However,  the  Commission  also 
receives  the  highest  proportion  of  people 
who  say  they  tend  not  to  trust  it  (30  0/0) 
although  this  figure  is  lower  than  it was  in 
the spring  of 1999 (33  0/0). 
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Related  to  trust  is  the  issue  as  to  whether 
people  support  EU  decision-making.  The 
survey regularly includes a question that asks 
whether  decisions  should  be  taken  at  the 
national  or  EU  level.  It  lists  25 policy  areas 
over  which  the  Union  has,  to  varying 
degrees,  decision-making competencies.  In 
autumn  1999,  on  average,  53  %  of people 
support  joint  EU  decision-making  in  these 
areas  and  EU  decision-making  is  favoured 
over  national  decision-making  in  17  of the 
25  areas. 
29 Graph  23: National or joint EU  decision-making (EU-15) 
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Graph  23  shows  people's  support  for  EU 
decision-making  with  respect  to  the 
Maastricht Treaty  policy areas. 
As  can  be  seen,  people  are  most  likely to  be 
of  the  opinion  that  decisions  concerning 
information  about  the  EU,  its  policies  and 
institutions should  be  taken  jointly by  the 
European  Union.  The  next four areas  where 
support for joint EU  decision-making  is most 
widespread  are  foreign  policy,  humanitarian 
aid.  science  and  technological  research  and 
the  fight against  poverty  and  social  exclu­
sion.  People are  least  likely to  want EU  deci­
sion-making for education. health and  social 
policy and  broadcasting rules  for  tile media. 
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When  it comes to the Amsterdam Treaty pol­
icy  areas,  we  find  that support  for  EU  joint 
decision-making  is  most  widespread  for  the 
fight against  human  trade  and  exploitation 
while  people  are  most  likely  to  support 
national  decision-making  in  the  areas  of 
policing and justice (Graph  24). 
30 Graph 24: National or joint decision-making after the Amsterdam Treaty (EU-15) 
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From  these figures  one  can  see  th at  people  life  but  want  the  national  governments  to 
follow  the  Union's  subsidi arity  principle.  decide  in  area s  th at  concern  them,  their 
They  support  joint  EU  decision-making  in  families or their country more  directly. 
areas  that either  transcend  national  borders 
or have a limited impact on their day-to-day 
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Policies  of the EU  at  the end 
of the 20th century 
Support for  the work  of the EU 
Does the  public regard  the current actions of 
the  European  Union  as  priorities) Nearly all 
EU  citizens  believe  the  fight against  unem­
ployment  should  be  a  priority  for  the 
European  Union  (Graph  25).  The  large 
majority  of  Europeans  also  believes  that 
maintaining  peace  and  security  in  Europe, 
fighting  organised  crime  and  drug  traffick­
ing and  fighting poverty and social exclusion 
should  be  priority actions  for  the  European 
Union. Graph  25 shows  that EU  citizens want 
the  EU  to  improve  or  safeguard  current 
standards  but  that  they  are  less  likely  to 
want  any  immediate  changes  to  the  status 
quo.  Hence  we  find  that the  public is  least 
likely to  view enlargement as  a priority. 
32 Graph  25  EU  actions: priority or not? (EU-15) 
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Ofo  priority 
Support for the single  currency 
The  Eurobarometer has measured  public sup­
port  for  the  single  currency  since  1993, 
when  the  Maastricht Treaty established  that 
the  euro  would  be  introduced  by  1 January 
1999. While  only around  half of EU  citizens 
were  in  favour  of the  single  currency  until 
1997,  support  levels  increased  significantly 
in  1998.  The  1999  results  show  a  slight 
decrease  in  support which  is  to  be  expected 
now  that  pre-introduction  enthusiasm  has 
been  replaced  by  the  reality  (Graph  26). 
0/0  not a priority 
Nonetheless, people are still much more like­
ly  to  be  in  favour of the euro  than  they were 
a few  years ago  ('). 
('J  More Information about  the euro can  be found at  http://europa.eu.lnt/curo/html/entry.html 
33 Graph  26: Support  for  the  single  currency  1993-99 
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In  1999, the euro  was  being introduced in  11  the  first group of countries tend  to  be  more 

countries,  the  'EUR-ll',  namely  Austria,  supportive  of  the  single  currency  (68  a/a) 

Belgium,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  than  are  people  in  the  'pre-in'  countries 

Italy, Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands, Portugal  (34  a/a)  (Graph  27) 

and  Spain.  At  th at  moment,  the  four coun­

tries  outside  the  euro  zone,  known  as  the 

pre-In  countries  were  Denmark,  Greece, 

Sweden  and  the  United  Kingdom.  People  in 

34 Graph  27: The euro: for or against? 
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Among  the  'pre-in'  countries,  people  in  Support for the single currency varies great­
Greece  (70  0/0)  con tinue  to  be  more  likely to  ly depending on how interested  and  on how 
support the  euro  than  are  people  in  the  UK,  well  informed  people  feel  about  the  euro 
Denmark  and  Sweden.  In  Sweden  and  (Table  5) 
Denmark, around  4 in  10  people  support  the 
euro and  5 in  10 people are  aga inst it.  In the 
UK supporters of the euro (25  0/0)  are  greatly 
outnumbered by opponents [59  0/0). 
35 Table  5:  Support for the single  currency 
0/0  in  favour  Ofo  against  0/0 don't 
of the tura  the euro  know 
People  who feel very or fairly 
interested in  the euro 
People who feel very well/well 
informed about the euro 
EU-15 average 
People who feel not very/not at all 
well  informed about the euro 
Peop le  who feel  not very or not at all 
interested  about the euro 
Source. ftlmtJ4llQmrrl'r S2',O- fi"l~h"O l  . Orl  - Nov.  1999. 
Support for  the common foreign 
and security po licy 
The  common  foreign  and  security  policy 
(CFSP)  was  established  by  the  Maastricht 
Treaty  and  came  into force  on  1 November 
1993.  Following  the  Amsterdam  Treaty, 
which  came  into  force  on  1  May  1999,  a 
High  Representative  for  the  CFSP  was 
appointed at the  Cologne  European  Council 
in  June  1999. 
The  Maastricht Treaty  enables  the  European 
Union  to  make  its voice  heard  on  the  inter­
national  stage  and  express  its  position  on 
armed  conflicts, human rights and  any other 
subject. 
75  20  5 
73  23  5 
60  32  8 
51  38  11 
41  47  12 
The  Treaty  also  provides  the  Union  with  a 
common  security policy that covers all  mat­
ters  relating  to  its  security,  including  the 
gradual  formulation  of a common  defence 
policy.  This  common  defence  policy  could 
lead  to  a common defence. 
36 Graph  28:  Support for a common  forein  and  defence  policy  %  in  favou r 
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Foreign  policy 
As  Graph  28  shows,  public  support  for  a 
common  foreign  policy  has  been  obtained 
from  over 6 in  10  EU  citizens while around  7 
in  10  people  have  supported  a  common 
defence  pol icy. 
Support  for enlargement 
In  December  1997,  the  process  of enlarging 
the  European  Union  to  the  south  and  the 
east  was  launched.  Some  13  new  countries 
have applied  to join the  EU  (').  They  should 
be  in  a position to join the Union  as  soon  as 
they  have  demonstrated  their  ability  to 
assume  the  obligations of membership. 
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Defence policy 
As  we  have  seen  earlier, many  EU  citizens do 
not  belie ve th at  enlargement  should  be  an 
immediate  priority for the  European  Union . 
Furthermore, public opinion on  enlargement 
has  not  yet  crystallised  with  many  people 
still  opting  for  the  'don't  know'  response 
when  as ked  about  their  support  for  coun­
tries  to become  part of the  European  Union 
(Graph  29).  Nonetheless,  EU  citizens  feel 
more favourable about some of the  13 appli­
cant countries joining the  EU  than  they feel 
about some  of the  others. 
I') 	 Tile 13 applicanl countrres  are Bulgarra,  Cyprus,  Ihe Czecil  Republic, ESlOnia,  Hungary,  LatVi a,  Lithuania,  Malta,  Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and  Turkey. More Information about enlargement can  be  found at: 
http  ://ww  w.europa.eu.l nt/coillm/eniargeme nt/index. htm 
37 Graph  29:  Support for enlargement (EU-15) 
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Alth ough  these  results  indicate  that  the 
public  appears  to  be  quite  hesitant  about 
new  countries Joini ng  the  EU,  general  atti­
tudes  about enlargement  are  in  fact  quite 
positive (Graph  30).  Seventy-two per cent of 
EU  citizens  believe  that  an  increase  in  the 
number  of  Member  States  will  make  the 
European  Union  a more  important player on 
the  world  sta ge.  Furthermore,  64  %  believe 
that  enlargement  will  increase  the  cultural 
% aga inst 
richness  of  the  European  Union  and  that 
more  peace  and  security will  be  guaranteed 
in  a larger  European  Union.  (Only  36  %  of 
people are of the  opinion that their country 
will  become  less  important  as  a  result  of 
enl argement.) 
38 Graph  30:  Attitudes towards enlargement of the  EU  (EU-1S) 
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O!o  tend  to disagree 
However,  people  are  less  optimistic when  it 
comes  to  the  economic  aspects  of enlarge­
ment.  Forty-seven  per  cent  of EU  citizens 
believe  that  their  country  will  receive  less 
financial  aid  from  the  European  Union  once 
new countries have joined.  An equal  propor­
tion  disagrees  with  the  statement  that 
'enlargement  will  not cost  more  to  existing 
member countries'.  Nonetheless,  quite a few 
citizens  (36  0/0)  show  an  altruistic  side  in 
agreeing  that  future  member  countries 
should start to receive  financial aid  from the 
EU  to  help  them  prepare  to join.  Another 
less optimistic  finding  is  that a substantial 
minority of EU  citizens (35 0 /0) agree that 'the 
more  countries  there  are,  the  more  unem­
ployment there  will be'  in  their country. 
When  it comes  to  preparing  the  European 
Union  for  enlargement,  the  majority of the 
public shares  the  view of the  policy-makers. 
Fifty-four  per  cent  and  fifty-two  per  cent, 
respectively,  agree  that  the  EU  must  reform 
the  way  its  institutions  work  and  that  the 
euro  has  to  be  in  place  before new  members 
can  join ('l. 
('J  Earlier,  we already noted  that reforming the European  Union  is seen  as a priOrity by  51  un.  of Europeans and  th ai succes 
fully implementing the euro is seen as  a priority by  60 'Yo  of Europeans. 
39 European  issues  and  priorities 

at the  end  of the 20th century 

t the  end of the  20th  century what issues are  most on  people's  minds,  that is  to  say, 
what issues are people most likely to  worry about? 
The  worries  of Europeans 
In  the spring of 1997, respondents were  pre­
sented  with a list of some of the big  political 
and social  issues of our  time and  asked  them 
to  indicate which ones  they were  most wor­
ried  abou t (Graph  31). 
Environment  and  unemployment  are  the 
most  widespread  concerns  and  hence  it  is 
not surprising  that  the  public  wants  the  EU 
to  make  the  fight against  both  issues  a pri­
ori ty,  as  we  have  shown  in  the  previous 
chapter.  Crime  is  the  third  most widespread 
concern  with  nearly  half of all  EU  citizens 
40 
listing  this  as  one  of their main  worries.  At 
44 0/0,  poverty comes  in  fourth place.  As  we 
saw  in  the  previous  chapter,  there  is  wide­
spread  support among  EU  citizens for priori­
tising  EU  actions both  in  fighting crime  and 
fighting  poverty.  Around  a  quarter  of 
Europeans  say  they  are  worried  about  drug 
abuse  and  more  than  2  in  10  are  worried 
about racism.  The  other issues shown  in  the 
graph  worry less  than  20  0J0  of the  EU  popu­
lation. 63 
Graph  31: The  worries of Europeans  (in  %  for EU-15) 
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Results  to  a question asking  people which of 
these  issues  they  were  least  worried  shows 
that  the  ageing  population  comes  in  first 
place (39 0/0),  European integration and glob­
alisation  come  in  shared  second  and  third 
place  (both  31  0/0)  and  the loss of traditional 
values comes  in  fourth place  (29  0/0). 
The  environment 
Since  the  environment  is  the  issue  that 
receives  most widespread  public concern, we 
begin  by looking in more detail at the results 
of a  spring  1999  Eurobarometer  question 
about  the  environment.  Respondents  were 
asked  the  following question: 
'Some  people  are  concerned  about environ­
mental  protection and  the fight against pol­
lution.  In  your  opinion,  is  it an  immediate 
and  urgent  problem,  more of a problem  for 
the  future or  not really a problem?' 
According  to  69  %  of EU  citizens,  environ­
mental protection and  the fight against pol­
lution  is  an  immediate  and  urgent  problem 
compared  to  only  4  a/a  who  think  it  is  not 
really  a problem.  23  a/a  see  it as  more  of a 
problem  for the  future and 3 %  lack an opin­
ion  (Graph  32). 
In  all  Member  States  more  than  half of the 
people  regard  environmental  protection  and 
the  fight against  pollution  as  an  immediate 
and  urgent  problem.  Nonetheless,  public 
concern  is  clearly  more  widespread  in  some 
countries  than  it  is  in  others.  People  in 
Greece  (91  0/0)  are  most likely to voice strong 
concern,  followed  by  people  in  Sweden 
(87  0/0)  and  Portugal  (82  0/0).  At 52  0/0,  peo­
ple in  France are least likely to consider envi­
ronmental  protection  and  the  fight against 
pollution an  immediate and  urgent problem. 
Belgium  (55  0/0)  and  Ireland  (56  0/0)  are  the 
only two other countries where less than 6 in 
10  people vOice  strong concern. 
41 Graph 32: Environmental protection  and  the  fight against pollution 
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The  causes of unemployment and 	 employment  policies  of  their  respective 
country but is  less likely to  blame  EU  policies wa ys  Lo  fight  it 
as  a cause  of unemployment.  Globalisation 
is  another  widely  regarded  cause  of unem ­ As part of a special  Flash  Eurobarometersur­
ployment. vey  on  the  November  1997  Luxembourg 
Employment  Summit,  16113  randomly 
selected  European  Union  citizens  were  sur­
veyed  about what they regard  as  the  causes 
and  solutions  to  unemployment  in  their 
cou ntry. 
Graph  33 shows  that the  public  is  most like­
ly  to  regard  the  behaviour of companies,  i.e. 
downsizing  and  restructuring, as  a cause  of 
unemployment.  Furthermore,  nearly two in 
three  EU  citizens are of the view that unem­
ployment  is  caused  because  people  lack  th e 
training  and  qualifications that are  required 
in  today's labour market.  As can  be seen, the 
public  voices  dissatisfaction  with  the 
42 Graph  33: The causes of unemployment (in %  for EU-15) 
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People  are  most likely to regard  stimulating  pie  to find work, easing young people's tran­
the  growth  of  small  and  medium-sized  sition  from  school  to  work  and  improving 
enterprises  as  a solution  to  unemployment  educational and vocational training. 
(Graph  34). There  is  also  widespread  support 
for  a  number  of  other  measures  such  as 
improving the chances for unemployed peo-
Graph 34:  Priorities for combating unemployment (EU-15) 
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The  public is  least likely to consider reducing  Iy  working  hours  as  solutions to unemploy­
unemployment benefits and  reducing  week- ment. 
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Graph  35 : The  European institutions should take a stronger role  in  the fight against racism 
(Ofo  tend  to  agree,  by country) 
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Racism  and  xenophobia 
In spring  1997 nearly 8 in  10 EU  citizens held 
the view that it is  a good  thing for any soci­
ety  to  be  made  up of people  from  different 
races,  religions and  cultures  (1). 
Despite  this  positive  finding,  at  the  close  of 
the  20th  century,  racism  remains  a serious 
problem  in  our  society.  The  survey  found 
tha t when  responden ts  were  asked  to  place 
themselves  on  a  scale  of  1  to  10,  ranging 
from  'not at  all  racist'  to  'very  racist',  9  Ofo 
classi fied  themselves  as  'very  racist'  (scores 
7-10).  A  further  24  %  fell  in  the  'quite 
racist'  category  (scores  4-6).  Thi s  self­
assessment  is supported by people's attitudes 
towards  foreigners or other minority groups. 
For instance,  41  0/0 of respondents are of the 
opinion that there  are  too many people  from 
minority  groups  in  terms  of  race,  religion 
and  cu lture living in  their country. 
The  good  news  is that  the  public  wants  the 
European  institutions to  take  a stronger role 
in  the  fight against  racism  (Graph  35).  The 
majority of Europeans across  the  15 Member 
States shares  this view. 
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44 Domestic violence  against  women 
In  1999,  the  European  Union  conducted  a 
European  campaign  to  raise  awareness  on 
violence  against  women.  The  campaign 
aimed  to  promote  increased  awareness  of 
violence  against  women  among  European 
citizens,  with  a  particular  emphasis  on 
domestic violence.  A survey  made  in  spring 
1999 to serve as the  vehicle  to  gauge  public 
opinion  in  preparation  of  the  campaign, 
found  that  three  in  four  EU  citizens  believe 
that violence against women  is very or  fairly 
common  in  their country. 
According  to 96 % of people, alcoholism  is a 
cause  of domestic  violence  against  women 
and  94  0J0  regard  drug addiction  as  a cause. 
Unemployment  was  listed  by  79  %  of 
respondents  while  poverty and  social  exclu­
sion  was  listed  by  75  0/0. 
When  asked  to  say  whether  domestic  vio­
lence against women  is  acceptable or  unac­
ceptable,  nearly two in  three people  felt that 
it  is  unacceptable  under  all  circumstances 
and  always punishable  by law. 
Nearly  all  people  interviewed  believed  that 
punishing  perpetrators  is  a  useful  way  of 
fighting  domestic violence.  Around  9 in  10 
people  said  that  teaching  young  people 
about  mutual  respect  and  tougher  enforce­
ment  of  existing  laws  are  good  ways  of 
fighting  the  problems.  Graph  36  depicts  the 
extent  to  which  the  public  supports  other 
suggested  methods. 
Graph  36: Ways of fighting domestic violence (Ofo  saying  method  is  useful,  for  EU-1S) 
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Tougher enforcement of laws 
A freephone number 
Tough er laws 
Inform~tion it'aflets 
Laws  to prevent sexual  discrimination 
Campaigns to "lise public aW,I[eness 
Small card  with emergency contact numbers 
Teaching women 's righ ts to roliet"  offin'rs 
Rehabilitation of perpetrators 
SO l/ rtl"  fr lm /Jo (o rn c /e( ~" fl.  ·  I-Irldwork: M~rrh M~y 1999. 
There  are, of course,  many other issues occu­
pying  the  minds of Europeans at the  end  of 
the  20th  century  and  numerous  European 
surveys  have  been  carried  out  to  obtain  a 
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better understanding of how  the  public feels 
about these  issues. How  Europ e lll< se c ,he ilis eives 
Shared  opinions? 

Women. the younger generation. 

and  leading  professionals 

/ 
ost of  our analyses in  this  report have focused  on  the  total population of  EU citizens 
aged  75  and over.  We  have  done  so  because  the  purpose of this brochure  is  to  present an 
overview of  public opinion on a wide range of issues and not to provide in-depth analyses on 
one specific topic which  would have  included looking at differences between  various groups 
in  the population. Nonetheless,  it is  also interesting to make a brief overview of the opinions 
towards the European  Union of  groups,  such  as  women,  the  young and top decision-makers. 
46 Women  and  the  European  Union 
As one would expect, Europe's women  do not 
all  think alike when  it comes to the European 
Union. In  fact. in-depth analyses have shown 
that there  are  five groups within the  female 
population,  each  group  having  a distinct set 
of views  on  the  European  Union (Graph  37) 
•  Sympathisers  are  women  who  want  a 
strong  and  large  European  Union  that 
decides  policy  issues.  This  group  represents 
25  %  of the  fem ale  population. 
•  Pragmatics  have  rationally  decided  that 
the  European  Union  represents  a  positive 
development.  However,  as  a  result  of her 
rationality,  the  pragmatic  woman  is  less 
inc lined  than  the  sympathiser  woma n  is  to 
give  the  EU  the  same  amount  of decision­
making  power.  Thi s group  represents  20  0/0 
of the  female  population. 
•  'Middle-of-the-roaders'  are  ambivalent 
about the Union, supporting some  issues and 
opposing others.  They  represent  14 %  of the 
female  populati on. 
•  The  undecisives  are  fairly  uninterested  in 
the  European  Union  and  often lack an  opin­
ion  on  issues  related  to  the  Union.  When 
they do  have  an  opinion,  it tends  to be  fair­
ly  negative.  This  group  represents  22  %  of 
the  female  population. 
• Sceptics regard  the  European  Union as  less 
positive than  what they have known so far­
the  concept  of independent  nation  States. 
The  19  %  of  women  that  belong  to  this 
group  are  the  strongest  opponents  of  th e 
Union. 
Graph  37  shows  the  extent to which  women 
belonging to each  of the five groups support 
their country's membership  to  the  European 
Union.  As  can  be  seen,  more  than  6 in  10 
women  who  are  pragmatics or  sympathisers 
believe  their country's membership  is a good 
thing, compared  to  less  than  2 in  10  women 
who  belong  to  the  'undecisives'  or  'scept ics' 
group ('). 
Graph 37: Women  and  support for the European  Union 
0/0 of each group that regards her country's membership as a good  thing 
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('J 	 More  information about the in-depth analys,'s of women's views towards  the European Union can be  fou lld in  the 
fnllnwlIlg report:  'Women's attitudes to the ~u ropean UnltJO  - A typology of public opinion among  Europe's  wome n'. 
The report can  be found  on  the Furopean  Commission's web  site at  : http://www.europa.eu. int/comm/dylO/epo/eb/eb47/ 
typology.hlml 
47 Young  people  and  the  Eu rop  an 
Union 
Like  women,  Europe's  young  people  also 
don't  all  think  alike  when  it comes  to  the 
European  Union.  In-depth  analyses  show 
that EU  citizens aged  15  to  29  can  be  placed 
into  three  distinct  attitudinal  groups 
depending  on  how  they  feel  about  the 
European  Union  (Graph  38) 
•  Sympathisers  are  young  Europeans  who 
want a powerful  European  Union  that takes 
policy  decisions.  As  dedicated  supporters, 
they  also  know  the  most  about  the  EU  and 
are  most  interested  in  learning  more.  This 
group represents 38  Ofo  of EU citizens aged  15 
to  29. 
•  Positive  pragmatics  are  young  Europeans 
who  have  rationally  decided  that  the 
European  Union  represents  a positive  devel­
opment.  However,  their  rationality  makes 
them  less  inclined  than  sympatllisers to  give 
the  EU  the same  amount of decision-making 
power.  This  group  represents  33  %  of the 
young  population. 
Graph  38: Young  people and  the European  Union 
Three distinct sets of attitudes 
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" 
Sceptics 28.00(0  ~ 
•  Sceptics  are  young  Europeans  who  hold 
largely negative feelings about the  European 
Uni on.  Of  the  three  groups,  they  are  also 
least  interested  in  the  EU.  Their  scepticism 
isn't limited to  the  European  Union; they are 
also  most pessimistic  when  it comes  to  their 
own  country  and  their  own  personal  life. 
Twenty-eight  per  cent  of young  Europeans 
belong  to  this group. 
!  Sympalhis~rs 38.0"10 
\  Po itiv ' pragmatk  33.0% 
48 Graph  39:  Young  Europeans  and  support for the European  Union 
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Graph  39  shows  the  extent  to  which  young  good  thing, compared  to only 2 in  10 young 
people belonging to each  of the three groups  Europeans  who  belong  to  the  'sceptics' 
support  their  country's  membership  to  the  group ('). 
European  Union.  As  can  be  seen,  more  than 
6 in  10  young  people  who  are  sympathisers 
and  more  than  half of the  positive pragmat­
ics  believe  their  country's  membership  is  a 
I') 	 More information about the In-depth "n"lyses  of young  Europeans'  views  towards  the  European  Union can be  found  in 
the  lollowmg  report:  'Voung  people's attitudes  to  the  I:uropea n  Union  - A  typology of public opini on  among  young 
Europeans'.  The report CIO  be found on  the European  Con lmllsion's web  site at: 
h t tp:flwww.europa.e u.in tlco mrnldgl0Iepoleb.htl11l 
49 Top  decision-makers  and  the 
European  Union 
In May 1996, a special survey was carried out 
among  a sample  of Europe's  top  decision­
makers  (TOM's).  As  Graph  40  shows,  top 
decision-makers are  considerably more  likely 
than  the  general  public  is  to  support  the 
European  Union.  They  are  also  much  more 
decisive,  with  only  4  %  considering  their 
Graph  40: Support for the European  Union 
Membership  to  the  European  Union  is . 
Top decision-makers 
Good 92.2% 
\ 
Bad  15.0'1'0  --­
Neither 3.9'1'0 
Don'l know 2.0% 
Bad  2.0% 
The  sample  consisted  of the  following  five 
categories  of TOM's:  civil  servants,  elected 
politicians,  business  and  labour  leaders, 
Nt·;th", 28.00/0 
Don"  know 9.0% 
10  top  decision-makers hold  this view,  com ­
pared  to only 4 in  10 members of the  gener­
al  public (Graph  41) 
media  leaders,  academic,  cultural  and  reli­
gious  leaders.  The  survey  found  very  little 
variation  in  support levels  for  the  European 
Union  among  these  groups. 
In  comparison  to  the  general  public,  top 
decision-makers  are  also  considerably  more 
likely to believe  that their country has bene­
fited  from  EU  membership. As  many  as  9 in 
50 
country's  membership  as neither  good  nor 
bad,  compared  to  28  %  among  the  general 
public. 
General public 
IGood 48.0% Graph  41:  Perceived  benefit of EU  membership 
0/0  holding  the view  that their country has . 
Top decision-makers 
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\ 
Benefitecf 43.0% 
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\ 
Not btndiH:d 8.0tVu 
Looking  again  at  the  five  categories  of top 
decision-makers shows that civil servants are 
most  likely  to  feel  that  their  country  has 
benefited  from  EU  membership  while  media 
leaders  are  least  likely  to  share  this  view. 
Gen  ral  public 
\ 
NOI  benefited 36.0<¥o 
However,  all  groups  of top  decision-makers 
are at least twice as  likely as  members of the 
general  public  to  hold  the  view  that  EU 
membership  is beneficial to  their country ('). 
I')  The  report  'A  view  from Ihe  top'  con  be  found at http://www.europa.eu.,nt/eomm/dglO/epo/polls.ht rnl 
51 Europeans  and  the  futu re 

Expectations for the 21  t century 
The autumn 1997 Eurobarometersurvey pre­ statements about  the  21st  century  (Graphs 
sented  Its  respondents  with  a  list  of  11  42  and  43) 
52 Graph  42: Feelings about the 21st century 
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Source:.  furobnromele(48 - Fieldwork  : OClobc:r-Novcmbcr  1997. 
Graph 43:  Feelings about the 21 st century 
negatively worded statements (EU-15) 
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SO(lfCC· EUfoboromeler 48 - FI(~ ldwO(k  Octobc:r-Novc:mbc(  1997 
All  in  all,  the  future  holds  more  good  than 
bad  for  the  majority  of Europeans.  Nearly 
half of EU  citizens believe that their children 
and  grandchildren  will  have  a  better  life 
than  they  have  had.  Equally,  half of  the 
population  disagrees  that  the  next  century 
will  be  worse  and  4  in  10  people  disagree 
that  their  country's  society  will  get  worse 
and  worse. 
In  many respects,  life will change a lot (56 % 
of respondents  hold  this  view).  Nearly  8 in 
10  people  believe  the  21st  century  will  be 
marked  by  significant  technological  change 
and nearly 7 in  10 believe  that it will be pos­
% tend  to agr~~ 
Pu c-enlage 'don't know' not shown 
sible to eliminate or cure serious diseases like 
AIDS  or cancer. 
When  it  comes  to  economic  and  political 
progress,  Europeans are  less optimistic about 
the future.  Nearly 7 in  10  EU  citizens believe 
that unemployment will be at least as impor­
tant as  it is  today  and  61  Ofo  feel  that there 
will  be  even  more  poor and  socially excluded 
people.  Less  than  4 in  10  people  are  of the 
view  that  th e overall  economic  situation  in 
their country will  improve  and  only  3 in  10 
people  agree  that  there  will  be  fewer  wars 
and  less violence in  the world. 
53 
67 The  European  Union 
in  the 21 st eentu ry 
As the left-hand pie in Graph  44 shows, 51  % 
of Europea ns  believe  that in  five  years'  time 
the  European  Union  will  playa more  impor­
tant  role  in  their  daily  life,  30  %  believe  it 
will  play  the  same  role  and  only 7 % believe 
it will  playa less  important role. 
Looking  at  the  role  people  wou ld  like  the 
European  Union  to  play  in  their daily life in 
five  years'  time  (the  right-hand  pie  in  the 
graph)  shows  that 45  %  of Europeans  desire 
a more  important role,  27  % desire  the same 
role,  while only 14 % desire a less  important 
role. 
As  one  would  expect  people  who  support 
their  country's  EU  membership  (65  %)  are 
significantly  more  likely  to  desire  a  more 
important role for the EU at the beginning of 
the  next century  th an  people  who  regard  it 
as  a bad  thing  (17  Ofo ).  Of  the  latter group, 
46 Ofo  would  like the EU  to  playa less impor­
tant role  in  five years'  time. 
Graph  44: The  role of the  European  Union  in  the 21 st century 
Perceived  Desired 
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Source: Ellloboromct('( 51 0 - f rdtlwnr k: O{,10 0 Cf  nve mber 1999 
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Graph 45: Young  people and their attitudes 
(In  %  from  most tolerant to least tolerant) 
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Source'.  Young EUfopeUIlS - EurobOfomr-l er 47 2. - Fieldwork: Aplll -lunt:  1997. 
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The future  leaders 	 The  survey measured  young  people's attitudes 
towards  a  range  of social  and  moral  issues young  Europea ns 
which shows that young people are  more tol­
erant and open-minded than older generations  Earlier  we  reported  that the large  majority of 
tend to be although they are by no means 'soft'  young Europeans are  in  favour of the European 
under all circumstances [Graph  45). Union. In  the final section of this brochure we 
look at some  concerns,  priorities and  views  of 
young  people.  This  information was  collected 
from a spring 1997 Euroborometerstudy which 
oversampled young people ['). 
Graph  46: The  meaning of the European Union 
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Source.  Yo ung fum/J("ons  - EUfoboromC"ter 47.2.  - Fiddwork: AWII-Jurlc 1 997. 
(')  In  lota l,  9 400 young  people aged  15  10  24  were interviewed. 
55 The  large  majority of young  people  approve 
of  premarital  sex  and  more  than  half  are 
against  the  death  penalty.  However,  as  can 
be  seen,  young  people  do  believe  in  quite 
harsh  forms  of  punishment  for  certain 
crimes. 
The survey also  found  that around a third of 
the young  population feels that their gener­
ation  has a responsibility towards the elder­
ly  (34  %)  and  that 25  %  feel  that the  pres­
ence  of  foreigners  adds  to  their  country's 
strength. 
Employment  is  the  issue  that young  people 
were  most  likely  to  choose  when  asked 
which  areas  the  European  Union should  pri­
oritise  in  the  next  five  years  (76  %).  The 
environment (60 0/0) and  research  and  devel­
opment  in  new  technologies  (54  0/0)  are 
other  areas  which  the  majority  of  young 
Europeans would like to see  as  EU  priorities. 
As  regard  to  what  the  European  Union 
means  to  young  people,  the  results  indicate 
that it represents the freedom  to move with­
in  the  15 Member States, a better future and 
a better  economic  situation,  as  these  were 
the most popular responses (Graph 46).  Very 
few  young  people  felt  that  the  European 
Union  represented  negative  elements  like 
too  much  bureaucracy,  loss  of Europe's cul­
tural  diversity or  the  EU  being  unrealistic. 
56 Other information on the E uropean  Un ion 
Information in  all the official  languages  of tile European  Union is available on the Internet. 
It can  be  accessed  through  lhe E uropa server  (europa.eu.int). 
EU R OPE DIRECT is a freephone service to help you find answers  to your Q uestions about the 
European  Union and to  provide  information about your  rights and opportunities as an EU citizen: 
1800 55 3188(lreland) 
0800 58 1591 (United  Kingdom). 
InFormation and  publications In English on the European Union can be obtained from' 
EUROPEAN  COMMISS ION 
REPRESEN rATIONS 
Representation in Ireland 
1i:l  Da w~ o n Street,  Dublin 2 
Tel.  (353-1) 662 51 13 
Representation in the United  Kingdom 
Jean  Monnet House,  8 Sto rey" ~ Gate, 
london  SW1  P 3AT 
Tel.  (44 -20)  79  73  1992 
InterneL www.cec.org_ uk 
Representation in  Wales 
4 Cathedral Road,  Cardiff CF  I  9SG 
Tel.  (4 4-29)  20 37  1631 
Representation in Scotland 
9 Alva Street, ~ d lll b urg h EH2 4f'H 
Tel.  (44-131)  225  20  58 
Representation in  Northern  Ireland 
Windsor  House,  9/  15  Bedford Street, 
Belfast BT2 7  EG 
Tel.  (44-28) 90 24  07  08 
Information services in  the USA 
2300 M Street,  NW,  Su ite 707, 
Washington  DC 20037 
Tel  (1-202) 862  95  00 
305 E ast 47th Street, 
3 Dag Hammarskjold Plaza, 
New York, NY 10017 
Tel  (1 -212)  371  3804 
Internet:  wwweuruniol1.org 
EUROPE AN  PAR LIAMEN  r 
OFFICES 
Office in  Ireland 
Eurorean Union  House, 
43  Molesworth Street. Dublin 2 
Tel.  (3 53-1) 6057900 
F~x (353- 1) 605 79  99 
E -mail. EPDubhn@europarl.cu.int 
Internet: www.europar l.eu.int 
United  Kingdom Office 
2 Queen Anne's Gate, London SIN I H 9AA 
Tel  (44-20) 72  27  43  00 
Fax  (44-20)  72  27  43 02 
[-mail.  EPLondon@ europarl.eu.int 
Internet  www.europarl.eu.lntiuk 
Office in Scotland 
9 Alva Street, C dlnburgh EH2  4PH 
T el. (44-131) 225 20  58 
F ax  (44-13l) 226 41  05 
E-mail: EPedi nburgh@ europarl.ell.int 
Internet:  www.eu rOPJrl.eu im/ uk 
European  Commission and  Parliament  representations and  offices exist  in all  the COllntnes of the 
European  Union. The European Commission  also  has delegations in other parts of the wo rld. Since  1973, the European 
Commission  has been 
measuring public opinion to 
inform itself about the views of 
European  Union citizens and  to 
share  the obtained information 
with the general public. The 
purpose of this brochure is  to 
present a selection of findings 
from these surveys.  I  t provides 
readers with a picture of how 
Europeans see  themselves by 
looking at a variety of subjects: 
citizens' values and  life  z 
satisfaction at the end of the  Q
w 
20th century, European citizenship, public opinion towards the 
European  Union,  public support for the policies of the European 
Union, public opinion towards a number of issues  that EU  citi­
zens worry about, people's expectations of the 21st century, etc  . 
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